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Abstract:  Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) play a key role in 
promoting the sustainable management of high seas fisheries. However, many RFMOs are 
not succeeding in this task. Whilst overexploited fish stocks can be blamed on illegal fishing 
and on States reluctant to implement robust conservation and management decisions, fault 
can also be found in the design of RFMO decision-making processes, specifically the use 
of consensus-based decision-making and objection procedures. This paper evaluates 
whether a new RFMO, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, 
and its ‘cutting edge’ decision-making procedure, can act as a model for more effective 
RFMO decision-making.  
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I Introduction  
High seas fish stocks are under considerable threat.1 There are many factors behind fish 
stock decline in this maritime zone. Pollution, excess capacity in global fishing fleets, 
subsidies, climate change and illegal, unregulated and unlawful (IUU) fishing have all been 
implicated as threats.2 Since the late nineteenth century, there have been a multitude of 
responses in the law of sea to these issues.3 One of the most important responses in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction are regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).4  
 
RFMOs are defined by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
as “intergovernmental organisations or arrangements, as appropriate, that have the 
competence to establish fisheries conservation and management measures”.5 This ability 
to develop legally binding conservation measures means RFMOs have a key role in 
promoting fish stock sustainability and conservation.6  The problem with RFMOs is that 
they have thus far been largely unsuccessful in achieving their objectives of fisheries 
sustainability.7 An estimated two-thirds of straddling and high seas stocks as well as one 
third of highly migratory tuna species are overexploited or depleted.8  
 
On one hand, several of the contributing factors towards fish stock decline are beyond the 
control of RFMOs, the lack of political will amongst States to implement and enforce 
  
1 Global Ocean Commission Improving Accountability and Performance in International Fisheries 
Management (Global Ocean Commission, November 2013) at 1.  
2  Secretary-General of the United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General 
A/69/71 (2014) at 3 and 16-17.   
3 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell International Law & the Environment (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 706-709. 
4 See Daniela Diz Pereira Pinto Fisheries Management in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Impact 
of Ecosystem Based Law-making (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2012) at 117.  
5 Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
[FAO] International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (FAO, 2001) at 3.    
6 Elise Anne Clark “Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management – An Analysis of the Duty to Cooperate” 
(2011) 9 NZJPIL 223 at 224.  
7 See Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly “Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation of Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations” (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1036.   
8 Jorge Csirke, Serge Garcia, Richard Grainger, Jean-Jacques Maguire and Michael Sissenwine  The State of 
World Highly Migratory, Straddling and Other High Seas Fishery Resources and Associated Species (FAO, 
Fisheries Technical Paper No 496, 2006). 
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robust conservation measures in particular.9 On the other, the design of many RFMOs is 
arguably blunting their efforts to effectively manage fish stocks.10 One aspect in particular 
that is impeding the work of RFMOs are the processes these organisations use to adopt 
fisheries conservation and management measures.11 Specifically, their work has been 
undermined by requirements for consensus-based decision-making as well as provisions 
that allow member states to easily opt-out of measures they find unpalatable.12  
 
Regardless of the lacklustre performance of RFMOs in the past, they still form “the 
backbone of high seas fisheries management”.13 Although, if they are to be truly successful 
in their task, the principles and processes of many RFMOs will have to undergo significant 
reform.14 It is timely, therefore, that a new RFMO has recently come into force: the South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO).15 SPRFMO 
incorporates modern principles and a cutting edge decision-making process.16 Combined, 
these arguably represent best practice for contemporary RFMO decision-making. 
 
The focus of this paper will be on SPRFMO’s decision-making process.  Before evaluating 
this decision-making process, and the promise it holds for other RFMOs, this paper will 
first provide an overview of the context and purpose of RFMOs. It will then explore the 
issues hampering the effectiveness of RFMO decision-making. This will focus on the 
  
9 David Anderson, Michael W. Lodge, Terje Løbach, Gordon Munro, Keith Sainsbury, Anna Willock 
Recommended Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an Independent 
Panel to Develop a Model for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
(Chatham House, 2007) at 134. 
10FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008 (FAO, 2009) 
at 69.  
11 Robin Warner Protecting the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the International Legal 
Framework (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009) at 125-126.   
12 Global Ocean Commission, above n 1, at 5.  
13 At 1.  
14 See FAO Food and Agriculture Department State of World Fisheries, above n 10, at 69; Robin Warner, 
above n 11, at 125-126; and Evelyne Meltzer The Quest for Sustainable International Fisheries: Regional 
Efforts to Implement the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (National Research Council of Canada, 
2009) at [4.7].  
15 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific 
Ocean (SPRFMO Convention) [2012] ATS 28 (opened for signature 1 February 2010, entered into force 24 
August 2012).  
16 Bill Mansfield “Presentation by the Chairperson of the SPRFMO Commission to the Review Panel” 
(SPRFMO, July 2013); and Howard S. Schiffman “The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (SPRFMO): an improved model of decision-making for fisheries conservation?” (2013) 3 J 
Environ Stu Sci 209.   
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processes component of RFMO decision-making, rather than the substantive criteria for 
making decisions. The paper will also develop a framework for best practice RFMO 
decision-making.  
 
The ‘best practice’ framework will be used to evaluate whether SPRFMO represents a 
model for effective RFMO decision-making. A recent case study will then be examined to 
assess how SPRFMO’s approach operates in practice. This will give further insight into 
whether it can indeed act as a potential model for future RFMO decision-making processes. 
The paper will conclude that, whilst SPRFMO’s decision-making processes will not work 
for all RFMOs, it is a significant step forward for RFMO decision-making that will 
hopefully be an impetus for change amongst other such organisations. 
 
II RFMOs: Decision-Making Institutions  
There are many problems confronting RFMO decision-making, and this paper contends 
SPRFMO is part of the solution. However, it is important to first establish the role of 
RFMOs in the law the sea, and why decision-making is critical to their work. This will 
provide important context to the issues plaguing RFMO decision-making processes, and 
potential solutions to these problems.  
 
Fishing has been a long standing freedom of the high seas.17 This is the 60 per cent of the 
world’s oceans not included in either territorial seas or exclusive economic zones.18 Since 
the mid-nineteenth century it has been recognised that fisheries are exhaustible, particularly 
in the face of more efficient technologies and increased fishing capacity.19 Additionally, as 
fisheries within national jurisdictions have been depleted, high seas fisheries have been 
subject to increasing exploitation.20  
 
The lack of a central governing authority in areas beyond national jurisdiction means fish 
stocks in this zone are especially susceptible to the problem of the tragedy of the 
commons.21 This is the idea “when a resource is held jointly, it is an individual’s self-
interest to deplete it, so people will tend to undermine their collective long-term interests 
  
17 Are K. Sydnes “Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Diversity Matters” (2001) 
32 Ocean Dev & Intl’l L 349 at 351. 
18 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly “Failing the High Seas”, above n 7, at 1036.  
19 Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens The International Law of the Sea (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2010) 
at 292-293.  
20 At 303.  
21 Sydnes, above n 17, at 350-351.  
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by over-exploiting rather than protecting that asset”.22 This context means it is imperative 
that States co-operate in exploiting commercial fisheries. 
 
In responding to the need to co-operate if fish stocks are to be sustainably exploited, the 
law of the sea has put RFMOs at the heart of addressing the issue of high seas fisheries 
conservation and management.23 Indeed, the need for co-operative regulatory and 
institutional arrangements to manage these fisheries has prompted the rise of RFMOs.24 
This was first signalled at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
which “agreed for the first time that the conservation and management of high seas fisheries 
resources could be carried out only through international cooperation in research and 
regulation”.25  
 
The principle of international law that States have a duty to cooperate when exploiting 
living resources on the high seas is now found in international custom, and is articulated in 
Article 117 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).26 Article 
117 establishes that all States have “the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in 
taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas”.27 Moreover, Article 118 also obliges 
states to:28 
 
cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living resources in 
the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or 
different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to 
taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. 
They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries 
organizations to this end. 
 
  
22  The Economist “Governing the Oceans: The Tragedy of the High Seas” (2014) 410 The Economist 10 at 
10.   
23 Michael Lodge Report and Documentation of the International Workshop on Factors Contributing to 
Unsustainability and Overexploitation of Fisheries (FAO, Fisheries Report No. 672, 2002) at 104-105  
24 Clark, above 6, at 224-225.  
25 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 2.  
26 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 70-71.  
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), art 117.  
28 UNCLOS, art 118.  
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The key role of RFMOs is to act as an institutional vehicle for this obligation of co-
operation.29 They do this by facilitating decisions on how the fisheries in their respective 
areas of competence are to be conserved and managed. Established by treaties, RFMOs 
“adopt measures on an ongoing basis that they deem necessary or desirable for those 
conservation and management purposes mandated by the[ir] treaty”.30  
 
RFMO decisions are typically made through a commission or council composed of 
representatives of its member States.31 Every member of the RFMO has a vote in this 
decision-making body. Decision are either made “by a majority, a supermajority, or a 
consensus depending on the regime and type of decision”.32“The number one decision that 
an RFMO needs to make is determining the total allowable catch (TAC) of a given species 
in a given season.”33  
 
The establishment of a TAC is only one of many decisions the RFMO’s Commission will 
be tasked with making. The RFMO also needs to conduct the politically fraught task of 
allocating the TAC between its member states in national quotas.34 RFMO’s also typically 
make a number of other conservation and management measures including the length of 
the season, the type of gear that may be used, measures to reduce by-catch, and on whether 
areas should be closed for fishing.35   
 
All RFMO decisions, especially “the determination of the TAC and allocation of the 
national quotas”, are informed by principles.36 These include the principle that decisions 
are to be informed by science, the application of precautionary principle and ecosystem 
approach, the need for compatibility of decisions between jurisdictions, the principle of 
non-discrimination between states, and the need to take into account the special 
  
29 Birnie et al., above n 3, at 392-393 and 739; and Anderson et al., above n 9, at 1.  
30 Howard S. Schiffman Marine Conservation Agreements: The Law and Policy of Reservations and Vetoes 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008) at 3.  
31 See Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.1].  
32 Howard S. Schiffman “The Evolution of Fisheries Conservation and Management: A Look at the New 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation in Law and Policy” (2011) 28:2 T M Cooley L 
Rev 181 at 183.  
33 At 183.  
34 Global Ocean Commission, above n 1, at 5; Schiffman “The Evolution of Fisheries”, above n 32, at 183. 
35 Schiffman “The Evolution of Fisheries”, above n 32, at 183. 
36 At 183. 
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requirements of developing states.37 However, conservation and management measures 
“are ultimately political and economic decisions”.38 
 
It should also be acknowledged that states are not required to use RFMOs to make decisions 
on the conservation and use of a fish stock. States can enter into direct arrangements with 
one another to achieve this aim.39 However, RFMOs have proved to be popular fora for co-
operation.  There are now around 18 RFMO’s in operation, covering the majority of the 
world’s marine fishery resources.40 Some date to the 1950s and earlier, with most being 
established from 1980 onwards.41  
 
The 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(FSA) has “significantly strengthened the position of RFMOs as the paradigm for the 
adoption of fisheries conservation and management measures”.42 The FSA builds on 
existing provisions in the UNCLOS, expanding the obligation to co-operate through 
regional bodies.43 Specifically, the FSA obliges States to cooperate through either direct 
arrangements or through RFMOs for the conservation of straddling stocks and the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of highly migratory stocks.44 The FSA does not, 
however, cover discrete high seas fisheries, which are fish stocks found largely in the high 
seas, nor does it apply to fish stocks that are found completely within national jurisdiction.45 
RFMOs can still regulate these fish stocks if that is provided for in their mandates, and, in 
respect of areas of within national jurisdiction, if they have the consent of the relevant 
coastal state.46 
  
37 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 19-20; and UNCLOS, art 119.  
38 Ted L. McDorman “Decision-Making Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
(RFMOs)” (paper presented to the Conference on Global High Seas Fisheries and the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement, St Johns, Newfoundland, May 2005) at [20]; Schiffman, “The Evolution of Fisheries”, 
above n 32, at 183.  
39 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 19, at 303-304; UNCLOS, art 63(2).   
40 Anderson et al., above n 9, at XVIII.  
41 See Michael Lodge Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries Governance by Strengthening 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (Chatham House, March 2007) at 3. 
42 Anderson et al., above n 9, at VIII.   
43 Birnie et al. above n 3, at 733.  
44 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks [Fish Stocks Agreement] 2167 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 4 December 1995, 
entered into force 11 December 2001), arts 7-8. 
45 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 19, at 318.  
46 Pinto, above n 4, at 126.  
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Figure One: Non-Tuna RFMOs (Source: European Commission) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two: Highly-Migratory Species RFMOs (Source: European Commission) 
 
Altogether, RFMOs are decision-making institutions. They do have other roles such as 
collecting fisheries statistics, assessing the state of fisheries resources, providing scientific 
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advice, and monitoring activities.47 However, their key role as regulatory institutions is to 
facilitate decisions between States on managing and conserving fish stocks. These 
decisions walk a delicate tightrope between satisfying the economic interests of states in 
fishing as well as trying to conserve and protect these living resources, and associated 
ecosystems. As such, it is important that the decision-making processes of each of these 
RFMOs work towards, rather than against, producing effective decisions.   
 
III Effective RFMO Decision-Making  
RFMOs evidently have an important role in the law of the sea, and central to that role are 
the decisions these institutions make. However, several commentators and reports have 
identified decision-making procedures as impediments to the effectiveness of regional 
fisheries management organisations.48 Indeed, the core contention of this paper is that 
particular aspects of RFMO decision-making processes can undermine effective 
conservation and management decisions, and that SPRFMO offers a decision-making 
model that could help make RFMOs more effective. Therefore a definition of what is meant 
by an effective decision-making process needs to be established. This will help with 
exploring issues that are making RFMO decision-making processes less effective, and with 
evaluating options for reform.  
 
Effectiveness can simply be defined “as the degree to which something is successful in 
producing a desired result”.49 In the context of RFMOs, the desired results are conservation 
and management measures that achieve the objectives of their conventions as well as those 
of other law of the sea instruments.50 For example, UNCLOS establishes that States taking 
conservation measures for living resources in the high seas shall, amongst other things:51 
 
  
47 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department “Governance of High Seas Fisheries” (2014) Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations <www.fao.org>. 
48 Tore Henriksen, Geir Hønneland and Are Sydnes Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes  (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Ledien 2006) 
at 204; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 14, at 69; McDorman, above n 38, at [2];  Robin 
Warner, above n 11, at 125-126; Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30.  
49 Oxford University “Oxford Dictionaries: Definition of Effectiveness” (2014) Oxford Dictionaries 
<www.oxfordictionaires.com>. 
50 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly “Failing the High Seas”, above n 7, at [5]. 
51 UNCLOS, art 119(1)(a).    
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take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the 
States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels 
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield. 
 
Meanwhile, the FSA obliges States to “adopt measures to ensure long-term sustainability 
of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and promote the objective of their 
optimum utilization”. 52  Most RFMO Conventions have objectives similar to these 
statements.53  If it could be established that RFMOs were meeting these high-level 
objectives, then it could be argued that the RFMO’s are effective institutions. 54 Thereby 
their decision-making process must also be effective. However, the reality is that RFMOs 
are generally not achieving outcomes such as fish stock sustainability.55 Indeed, whilst 
there are difficulties obtaining definitive data on the current state of high seas fisheries, the 
most recent FAO assessment found that 60 per cent of straddling and high seas stocks and 
thirty per cent of tuna stocks were overexploited.56  
 
The 2010 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly study into the effectiveness RFMOs suggests there is 
much to be concerned about with RFMOs in particular. According to the study’s 
methodology paper, “the effectiveness of current RFMOs has never been comprehensively 
assessed”, an omission it aimed to address.57 The study’s global evaluation of RFMO 
effectiveness was based on a two-tiered approach.58 It first looked at how RFMOs 
performed “on paper”, and then into how RFMOs were performing “in practice”.59  
 
The ‘on paper’ score looked into how well RFMOs were incorporating 26 different best 
practice criteria, as established by the Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved 
Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (the Chatham House 
Panel).60 The authors found an average score of 57% performance against theoretical best 
practice, evidently leaving considerable room for improvement. However, the ‘in practice’ 
  
52 Fish Stocks Agreement, art 5(a).  
53 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, above n 7, at [5].  
54 At [5].  
55 See Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, above n 7.   
56 Csirke et al., above n 8, at [9.1].  
57 Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly Evaluating Global Fisheries Management Organizations: 
Methodology and Scoring (University of British Columbia Fisheries Centre, Working Paper 2009-12, 2009) 
at 2.   
58 At 3. 
59 At 3. 
60 At 4.  
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score was even more worrying. It evaluated how well stocks actually do under RFMO 
management, looking at current stock biomass and performance through time. Of the 14 
RFMOs studied for this exercise, the average score was 49% performance. The authors 
noted the establishment of an RFMO in most cases “did not seem to have visible positive 
effect on stock biomass”, indeed the trend was one of decline.61 Perversely, “in many cases, 
severe stock declines occurred after an RFMO was established”.62  
 
The Cullis-Suziki and Pauly study demonstrates that RFMO’s can hardly be labelled as 
‘effective’ organisations. However, determining the degree of causation between decision-
making processes and RFMO effectiveness is problematic.   This is because there are a 
variety of causative factors behind fish stock decline.63 Although structural and governance 
weaknesses have been implicated as a challenge confronting RFMOs, they could 
theoretically be deciding on best practice measures only to be defeated by poor 
enforcement, illegal fishing and pollution. 64   
  
Another more fundamental issue arguably lies with the nature of the international law of 
the sea itself. On the high seas a fundamental principle is that of exclusive flag state 
jurisdiction.65 A fishing vessel operating on the high seas is prima facie “only subject to 
the jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly”.66 Whilst the duty to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of living resources is “widely accepted as a customary 
principle of international environmental law”,67 the content of the duty to co-operate in 
international customary law has not clearly developed to stage where non-RFMO 
participants are required to apply an RFMO’s conservation and management measures.68 
The FSA does provide that States only discharge their duty of co-operation by either joining 
the RFMO of a relevant fishery or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management 
  
61 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly Evaluating Global Fisheries, above n 57, at 12-13.  
62 Pew Environment Group High Seas Management Gets Low Marks: A Summary of a New Scientific Analysis 
(Pew Environment Group, May 2010) at 4.  
63 See Secretary-General of the United Nations, above n 2, at 16-17.  
64 Global Ocean Commission, above n 1, at 1. 
65 Clark, above n 6, at 225; Warner, above n 11, at 35-38; UNCLOS, pt VII.   
66 Clark, above n 6, at 225. 
67 At 223.  
68 At 230-244.  
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measures established by the organisation.69 The problem is that only a relatively small a 
States are party to the FSA.70 
 
If a state has not ratified the FSA or if they are not a member of a particular RFMO, they 
are not explicitly obliged to implement a particular RFMO’s measures in respect of 
straddling and highly migratory stocks.71 This inability to compel compliance from ships 
operating under the jurisdiction of non-RFMO and non-FSA member states can undermine 
the effectiveness of RFMO conservation and management regimes.72 Indeed, IUU fishing 
does seriously undermine the effectiveness of RFMOs.73   
 
Altogether, it is evident that RFMO decision-making effectiveness cannot simply be 
determined by looking to what extent the RFMO is meeting its own treaty objectives and 
those of other international instruments. Problems with RFMO decision-making are simply 
one of a multitude of other issues.  Another set of evaluative criteria is therefore needed. 
Fortunately, in confronting the same problem of what is meant by an effective RFMO 
decision-making process, McDorman has developed a more holistic set out of criteria to 
establish effectiveness. This is in relation to what he calls “decision adoption procedures”.74 
This criteria has three elements.  For a decision to be effective, the decision must be: 75  
 
a) Acceptable to RFMO members; 
b) Made in a timely manner; and 
c) It must be conservation orientated. 
 
In the article where McDorman outlines these criteria he does not elaborate on why these 
particular characteristics were chosen.76 However, it can be assumed that acceptability is 
important as greater support for a decision “is expected to result in better compliance and 
implementation”.77 Moreover, a decision that has broad acceptance is unlikely to be 
  
69 Fish Stocks Agreement art 8(3).  
70 Kristen E Boon “Overfishing of Bluefin Tuna: Incentivising Inclusive Solutions” (2013) 52 U Louisville 
L Rev 1 at 12; and Pinto, above n 4, at 129.  
71 Meltzer, above n 14, at 189.  
72 At 12.   
73 Yoshifumi Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) at 
[6.1].  
74 McDorman, above n 38, at [13].  
75 At [13].  
76 See McDorman, above n 38.  
77 Meltzer, above n 14, at 8.4.3.  
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disputed by an RFMO participant or cause division within an RFMO that could hamper 
timely decision-making.  
 
Timely decision-making is an important characteristic on its own.78 It provides certainty 
and helps ensure the coherency of the management regime. If decisions are delayed this 
may leave gaps in the conservation regime, and undermine the efficacy of the RMFO’s 
conservation measures.79 Additionally, conservation orientation is essential, otherwise the 
decision itself will do little to help ensure that a fish stock is sustainably harvested. This 
criterion goes to the very purpose of RFMO’s as vehicles for conservation and management 
decisions.80 Altogether, if any of the criteria are missing from a decision it follows that the 
effectiveness of the decision would be adversely affected. Therefore McDorman’s three 
criteria are arguably necessary conditions for effective decision-making, thereby providing 
a useful normative framework for evaluating RFMO practice.  
 
There are other desirable elements that can added to McDorman’s criteria. Firstly, the 
principle that States are only bound by treaties to which they are party means it is important 
that RFMOs be designed to encourage wide participation.81 As was noted above, non-
participants can undermine the efficacy of RFMO measures.  McDorman notes that even 
if a State has ratified the FSA, “some States have strong views on whether a particular 
decision-making process will result in the attainment of their interests”.82 Consequently, 
the design of effective decision-making procedures needs to account for how it will impact 
on participation in the regime.  
 
Another desirable characteristic is transparency.83  The exact value of transparency has 
been questioned, with Barrett arguing it can in fact undermine co-operation. 84 Indeed, it is 
arguably not a necessary condition for producing effective decisions. However, by opening 
decisions to third-party scrutiny, transparency also brings greater accountability to the 
decision-making process, thereby improving effectiveness.85 Regardless, it is also 
  
78 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 40-41.  
79 See Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.4.3]. 
80 Anderson et al, above n 9, at 1.  
81 Meltzer, above n 14, at 199.  
82 McDorman, above n 38, at [4].   
83 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4].  
84 Scott Barrett Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 145-146.  
85 Meltzer, above n 14, at 201. 
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mandated by Article 12 of the FSA.86 Transparency will therefore be accounted for in 
evaluating SPRFMO’s processes later in this paper.  
 
IV Key Issues in RFMO Decision-Making  
Effective RFMO decision-making is not just a desirable for goal for RFMOs. The FSA in 
fact obliges States to “agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption 
of conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner”.87 
Additionally, in order to prevent disputes, the FSA provides that “States shall agree on 
efficient and expeditious decision-making procedures … and shall strengthen existing 
decision-making procedures as necessary”.88 However, the Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly study 
concludes that most RFMOs are failing to produce effective decisions.89 They are, 
therefore, out of step with these international norms. Accordingly, solutions are needed. 
Yet, before assessing the extent to which SPRFMO offers a cure for defective decision-
making processes, it is important to first identify the key issues facing RFMO decision-
making.  
 
It must first be made clear that this paper is focusing on substantive rather than procedural 
RFMO decisions. The Chatham House Panel’s report into RFMO best practice divides 
RFMO decision-making into these two categories.90 Substantive decisions relate to 
conservation and management measures which “are at the heart of the work of RFMOs”.91 
Whilst procedural decisions, such as the adoption of budgets, are certainly important to the 
functioning of RFMOs as organisations, they are of secondary importance to the 
conservation and management goals of these organisations.92  
 
The Chatham House Panel also identifies two components to substantive decision-making. 
These are the processes and criteria used for adopting a decision.93 Decision-making 
criteria includes taking account matters such as scientific advice, the precautionary 
approach and any conservation measures already implemented by coastal states.94 In 
contrast, process includes matters such the required level of support as well as objection 
  
86 Fish Stocks Agreement, art 12. 
87 Art 10(j).  
88 Art 28.  
89 Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly “Failing the High Seas, above n 7, at [5].  
90 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 70.  
91 At 70.  
92 At 70.  
93 At 70.  
94 SPRFMO Convention, arts 3-4.  
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procedures,95 which are “intimately tied to formal procedures for decision adoption in 
many RFMOs”. 96   
 
Both process and criteria are important to producing effective decisions. Indeed, a decision-
making process can be rapid and fully accepted by an RFMO’s member states, but may not 
actually achieve the conservation and management goals of these organisations unless it is 
informed by scientific advice and key guiding principles.97 Indeed, the fact that RFMOs 
scored, on average, only 5.4 out of 10 for their application of the precautionary approach 
in the Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly study does suggest there is real scope for improvement in 
this area.98 However, the core focus of this paper will be on the decision-making process 
itself. This is both because the particularly novel feature of SPRFMO is its decision-making 
process, and also to allow for sufficient discussion of the issues confronting RFMO 
decision-making processes within the context of this paper.99  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, the decision-making process will be broken into its two 
core components. Firstly, it will look at problems associated with the level of support 
needed to adopt a decision, otherwise termed as decision-adoption procedures.100 The main 
issue in this area are the negative impacts of consensus or unanimity-based decision-
making. Secondly, it will examine issues associated with objection procedures. This will 
find that excessive use of objection procedures can be a significant problem for decision 
efficacy.  
A Decision-Making Based on Consensus and Unanimity  
The level of support needed for a proposal to become a binding decision of an RFMO’s 
commission is a crucial aspect of the decision-making process. Whilst there are a variety 
of methods used by RFMOs, Table One (below) shows the trend is to require decisions to 
be adopted by consensus or by unanimous voting.101 Even where consensus is not formally 
required, general RFMO practice is to seek consensus.102 Consensus in RFMO treaties is 
typically defined as the absence of an objection when a decision is made.103 In contrast, 
  
95 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 74.  
96 McDorman above n 38, at [14].  
97 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 76-77.  
98 Pew Environment Group, above n 62, at 3.  
99 Joanna Mossop “Law of the Sea and Fisheries” (2009) 7 NZYIL 336 at 336 and 338. 
100 See McDorman, above n 38, at [2.1].  
101 At [11].  
102 At [10].  
103 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 74.  
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unanimity generally requires every State to formally vote for a measure for it to pass.104 
Both procedures can work towards undermining the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process.  
 
Table One:  Voting Procedure in  18 RFMO Conventions105 (Year Established)106 
RFMO Procedure RFMO Procedure 
IPHC (1923) Consensus.107 PSC (1985) Consensus108 
IATTC (1950) Consensus.109   NPAFC (1993) Consensus.110  
GFCM  (1952) 2/3 majority vote.111  CCSBT (1994)  Unanimous vote.112   
ICCAT (1969)  2/3 majority vote.113 CCBSP (1996)  Consensus.114   
IBSFC (1974) 2/3 majority vote. 
115  
IOTC (1996)  Simple majority.116 
  
104 Meltzer, above n 14, at 191-192. 
105By most recent in force Convention, and substantive decisions only. Table concept derived from Pinto, 
above n 4, at 130.  
106 Derived from Lodge, above n 42, at 3. 
107 Convention between the United States of America and Canada for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery 
of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea [IPHC Convention] 222 UNTS 77 (signed 2 March 1953, 
entered into force  28 October 1953), art III.  
108
 Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America 
Concerning Pacific Salmon [PSC Treaty] 1469 UNTS 358 (signed 28 January 1985, entered into force 18 
March 1985), art II(6)  
109  Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 
1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica UST [Antigua 
Convention] available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf  (Opened for 
signature November 14 2003, entered into force August 27 2007), art IX(3).  
110 Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean [NPAFC Convention] 
(Signed 11 February 1992, entered into force 16 February 1993), art VII(10).  
111Agreement for the establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean as amended by the 
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean [GFCM Convention] 2275 UNTS  157 (6 November 1997), 
art V(1).  
112 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna [CCBST Convention] 1819 UNTS 360 
(opened for signature 10 May 1993, entered into force 20 May 1994), art 7.  
113 International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas [ICCAT Convention] 673 UNTS 63 
(signed 14 May 1966, entered into force 21 March 1966), art VIII.  
114 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Bering Sea [CCBSP 
Convention] 34 ILM 67 (opened for signature 16 June 1994, entered into force 8 December 1995), art V.  
115 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts [IBSFC 
Convention] 1090 UNTS 93 (signed on 13 September 1973, entered into force 28 July 1974), art VIII(3).  
116 Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC Convention] 1927 UNTS 
329 (signed 25 November 1993, entered into force March 27 1996), art IX(1).  
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NAFO (1979) 2/3 majority vote.117   SEAFO (2003) 2/3 majority vote.118 
CCAMLR (1982)  Consensus.119 WCPFC (2004)  ¾ vote, if consensus 
cannot be reached. 120 
Consensus if on 
‘consensus list’.121 
NEAFC (1982)  2/3 majority vote. 
122 
SIOFA (2012)   Consensus.123  
NASCO (1983) Unanimous vote. 124 SPRFMO (2012)  ¾ vote, if consensus 
cannot be reached.125 
 
Firstly, there is a distinction between unanimity and consensus-based decision-making.126 
The former is vote-based. This can be advantageous “as the issue is resolved at a specific 
point in time. By putting a question to a vote, positions of the participants are clarified and 
polled, and a decision is finally taken.”127 In contrast, the consensus approach “may involve 
protracted discussion or intractable parties, which can lead to stalemates and paralysis”.128  
Conversely, vote-based decision-making “may create contending factions within the 
  
117 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries [NAFO Convention] 
1135 UNTS 369 (signed 24 October 1978, entered into force January 1 1979), art XIV(2).  
118 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean 
[SEAFO Convention] 2221 UNTS 91 (opened for signature 20 April 2001, entered into force 17 May 2001), 
art 17. 
119 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources [CCAMLR Convention] 1329 
UNTS 47 (opened for signature 20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982), art XII.   
120 Convention on the Conservation  and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific [WCPFC Convention] 2004 ATS 15 (opened for signature 5 September 2000, entered into 
force 19 June 2004), art 20.  
121 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean [WCPFC Convention] 2275 UNTS 43 (signed 5 September 2000, entered into force 
19 June 2004),  art 10(4).  
122Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries [NEAFC Convention]  
1285 UNTS 130 (signed 18 November 1980, entered into force 17 March 1982),  art 3(9) and 5.   
123 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA Convention) available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/2_035t-e.pdf (opened for signature 7 July 2006, 
entered into forced 21 June 2012), art 8.   
124 Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean [NASCO Convention] 1338 
UNTS 34 (signed 2 March 1982, entered into force 1 October 1983), art 11(3).  
125 SPRFMO Convention, art 16.  
126 Meltzer, above n 14 , at [8.4.3.1]; and Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 111-122.   
127 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3].  
128 At [8.4.3]. 
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organization, or trigger, where available, the use of the objection procedure”.129 However, 
despite the “dynamics” of the procedures being different, as both methods essentially 
require all members of an RFMO to consent to a decision, they will be treated as the same 
for the purposes of this discussion.130  
 
On one hand, consensus and unanimity ensure that the decision is at least acceptable to all 
States. This is consistent with the principle of international law that States are generally 
only bound by decisions to which they assent.131 On the other hand, both have “been 
criticized for leading to protracted decision making, paralysis or diluted conservation 
measures”.132 In 2008 the FAO specifically identified the use consensus-based decision-
making as a component of RFMO frameworks that was impairing their effectiveness.133  
 
Where unanimity and consensus are required, any member of the RFMO can exercise a 
“de facto veto” over the process, and possibly demand concessions that undermine the 
conservation effect of a decision and its acceptability to other members.134  Even if a 
decision is reached:135 
 
the final outcome acceptable to all States may be considerably below the conservation 
standard required to avoid overfishing, rebuild fish stocks, and rehabilitate critical 
habitat. As a result, RFMO management decisions are often based on the “lowest 
common denominator” and do not necessarily meet the international minimum 
standard for effective management.  
 
One extreme example of the negative consequences of a unanimity requirement can be 
found in the history of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(CCSBT). Schiffman observes that the unanimity requirement in the CCSBT was “beyond 
any doubt, in the mid to late 1990s … a major limitation on the work of the regime”.136 For 
many years the CCSBT Commission was unable to establish a TAC for southern Bluefin 
tuna.137 This is a fish stock that was, and still remains, a listed critically endangered 
  
129 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3], at [8.4.3].  
130 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3.1]; and Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 112.  
131 McDorman, above n 38, at [4].  
132 Meltzer, above n  at 186  
133 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department State of World Fisheries, above n 10, at 69.  
134 Anderson et al, above n 9, at 73. 
135 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.4.3].  
136 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 120.  
137 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 19, at 305. 
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species.138 From 1994 onwards Japan wanted to increase the TAC and its catch allocation, 
as well as establish an experimental research program above its catch allocation.139  New 
Zealand and Australia opposed these proposals. When Japan decided to persist with its 
research proposals in 1998, this precipitated international litigation before International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.140 The unanimity requirement had, therefore, created an 
impasse in the regime, undermining efforts to restore a badly depleted fish stock and 
generating division amongst its members.141  
 
A requirement for consensus or unanimity does not necessarily result in an ineffective 
decision-making process. The Commission of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources’ (CCAMLR) 2012 Performance Review Panel stated that its consensus-based 
decision-making model had worked well.142 However, the Performance Review Panel 
qualified this conclusion by “stating the consensus rule in the implementation of some 
conservation measures had nevertheless created problems, and the potential for conflict 
was growing in this respect”.143 Indeed, Joyner has argued in the context of CCAMLR that 
“consensus-based decision-making can carry too exorbitant a price”, with consensus 
paralysing CCAMLR for more than half a decade in the 1980s.144   
 
As with CCAMLR’s reviewers, Schiffman makes similarly qualified observations about 
the use of consensus in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the North Atlantic 
Salmon Commission (NASCO). In context of the IOTC, he first noted that the organisation 
had “impressively” adopted all substantive decisions by consensus.145 However, he went 
on to say “this observation must be tempered, however, with the likelihood that consensus 
is being achieved at the lowest level of common agreement”.146 Schiffman also made 
  
138 Rothwell and Stephens, above n 19, at 305.  
139 At 305; and Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 121-123 
140 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 121-123; and Rothwell and Stephens, above n 19, 305.   
141 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 124-126  
142 Marika Ceo, Sarah Fagnani, Judith Swan, Kumiko Tamada and Hiromoto Watanabe Performance Reviews 
by Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, Synthesis and Best Practices (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072, 2012) at 14.  
143 At 69.   
144 Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Decision-Making (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1998) at 127; and Schiffman Marine 
Conservation, above n 30, at 154.  
145 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 77.  
146 At 77  
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similar observations in respect of the NASCO, adding that unanimity had typically slowed 
down its decision-making process.147   
 
The examples and observations above illustrate the impact consensus-based decision-
making can have on decision-making efficacy. Evidently, it can undermine decision 
timeliness and conservation orientation. Moreover, the deadlock in the CCSBT 
demonstrates how it can paralyse the work of an RFMO. Taken together, the examples 
establish why RFMOs must take steps to mitigate these risks if they are to ensure the 
efficacy of their processes.  
B Objection Procedures 
Objection procedures are mechanisms that allow a member State to “prevent a conservation 
measure adopted under a treaty regime from applying to” them.148 Objections typically 
have to be made within a set period of time following a State being notified of a decision, 
and, often, if enough members object, a decision will cease to be binding on all RFMO 
members.149  
 
RFMOs have a “long tradition of allowing parties to object to, and opt out of, decisions 
they deem undesirable”.150 Schiffman identifies this as a major factor behind the lack of 
success of many RFMOs.151 As Table Two (below) demonstrates, the majority of RFMOs 
have procedures in place allowing states to opt-out of conservation and management 
measures. Interestingly, they are common amongst RFMOs who have consensus or 
unanimity-based decision-making, where every member would have already assented to a 
decision.152  This particular combination has been called a “double-veto”.153  
 
 
 
  
147 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 134-135.  
148 At 5.  
149 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.5].  
150 Schiffman “The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation”, above n 16, at 211.   
151 At 211.  
152 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.5].  
153 Olav Schram Stokke The Effectiveness of CCAMLR in Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and 
Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 142 as cited in 
Schiffman, above n 30, at 153.  
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 Table Two: Objection Procedure in 18 RFMOs154 (Year Established)155 
RFMO Objection 
Procedure 
RFMO Objection Procedure  
IPHC (1923)  No procedure. 156 PSC (1985)  No procedure.157    
IATTC (1950)  No procedure. 158 NPAFC (1993) No procedure.159 
GFCM  (1952)  Yes.160 CCSBT (1996) No procedure.161  
ICCAT (1969)  Yes but must 
reaffirm. 162  
CCBSP (1996)  No procedure.163 
IBSFC (1974) Yes.164 IOTC (1996)  Yes.165 
NAFO (1979) Yes.166 SEAFO (2003) Yes, but must provide 
reasons and there is the 
possibility of review 
and binding interim 
measures.167   
CCAMLR (1982) Yes, decision can 
also be reviewed by 
Commission on 
request.168  
WCPFC (2004) No, but decision can 
be independently 
reviewed on limited 
grounds.169 
NEAFC (1982) Yes.170 SIOFA (2012)  No.171 
  
154 Per most recent in force treaty. Table concept derived from Diz Pereira Pinto, above n 4105, at 130. 
155 Derived from Lodge, above n 42, at 3. 
156 IPHC Convention. 
157 PSC Convention.  
158 Antigua Convention, art IX.  
159 NPAFC Convention.  
160 GFCM Convention, art V(3).  
161 CCBST Convention.  
162 ICCAT Convention, art VIII(3).  
163 CCBSP Convention.  
164 IBSFC Convention, art XI.  
165 IOTC Convention, art IX(5).  
166 NAFO Convention, art XII.  
167 SEAFO Convention, art 23.   
168 CCAMLR Convention, art IX(6).  
169 WCPFC Convention, art 20(6).  
170 NEAFC Convention, art 12.  
171 SIOFA Convention, art 8.  
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NASCO (1983)  Yes172 SPRFMO (2012) Yes, on limited 
grounds. Automatic 
independent review 
and equivalent 
measures must be 
adopted.173   
 
The Chatham House Panel has labelled objection procedures an “unusual feature” of 
RFMOs,174 noting “there is no procedure for objecting to a binding decision of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter”.175 Objections can be analogised to treaty 
reservations.176 Both have similar rationales: to encourage “participation in treaty regimes 
by a wider range of states than might otherwise be possible.”177  
 
Whilst not as potentially damaging as a veto which can “block a measure from coming into 
existence in the first instance”,178 objections “prevent a conservation measure adopted 
under the treaty regime from applying to a treaty member”179. Thereby, if the objector is 
allowed to set their own measures as a result, they can limit the conservation effect of a 
decision. Although, not all objections will undermine the conservation regime.180 
Furthermore, the acceptability of the decision to which States find themselves bound may 
diminish when they see other RFMO members establishing their own unilateral 
measures.181  
 
International law places several caveats on the use of objection procedures.182 Just as 
general reservations should not interfere with the object and purpose of a treaty,183 the use 
  
172 NASCO Convention, art 13(3).  
173 SPRFMO Convention, art 17.  
174 Andersen et al, above n 9, at 75.  
175 At 75.  
176 At 75.  
177 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 25. 
178 At 5 
179 At 5  
180 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 75.  
181 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.5].  
182 See Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at ch 4.  
183 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 157 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 19.  
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of objections should not frustrate the objectives of an RFMO’s convention.184 Indeed, 
States are obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
they are party to.185 Their use should also be constrained by the duty on States to co-operate 
in good faith with RFMOs and treaty partners, as well as obligations in the UNCLOS and 
FSA where States are parties to these treaties, or where these obligations represent 
international customary law.186 However, ensuring States conform to these obligations is 
easier said than done in practice.187  
 
Despite the legal limits placed on objection procedures, their repeated use has damaged 
RFMO regimes in the past. The history of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
(NAFO) is a prime example of this. NAFO’s decision-making contains an objection 
procedure with few prescribed limits on its use.188 States are able to opt-out of a decision 
without providing any justification or proposing alternative measures.189 Schiffman notes 
that between 1979 and 2005, NAFO members lodged 160 objections to 83 separate 
conservation measures.190 Cox et al. observed that objections were mainly related to TACs, 
quotas and effort regulations; in other words, the most critical decisions an RFMO is tasked 
with making.191 Russell notes that the “abuse of the procedure has been identified as one 
of the principal reasons for the failure of NAFO to fulfil its objectives”.192  
 
NAFO’s objection procedure was not only widely used, but also became a source of 
conflict from the 1980s onwards.193 The European Commission consistently used the 
objection procedure between 1986 and 1992, thereby allowing it to set its own TAC.194 
This often significantly exceeded the ones set by NAFO, and contributed to the 
deterioration of stocks under management.195 The consistent abuse of the objection 
  
184 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 18; and Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 
172-181.  
185 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 18.  
186 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 75; See Meltzer, above above n 14, at 189.  
187 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 198.  
188 NAFO Convention, art XII.  
189 Anthony Cox, Leonie Renwrantz and Ingrid Kelling Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2009) at 94. 
190 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 55.  
191 Cox et al., above n 189, at 101.  
192 Dawn A. Russell and David L.Vanderswagg (ed.) Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management 
Arrangements in Light of Sustainability Principles (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2010) at 246. 
193 Russell et al., above n 192, at 246.  
194 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 57.  
195 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 57; and Russell et al., above n 192, at 246.    
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procedure prompted Canada to take expansive unilateral enforcement action in order to 
conserve cod fisheries.  This led to a souring of relations between Canada and Europe, with 
Spain even taking Canada to the International Court of Justice.196 Altogether, this 
demonstrates that objections can not only impact on the conservation effect of management 
decisions, but can also undermine co-operation and decision acceptability within the 
RFMO.  
 
As with consensus or unanimity based decision-making, it does not necessarily follow that 
objections will hinder the effectiveness of an RFMO. Schiffman states that the IOTC’s 
objection procedure has been used infrequently, and Meltzer observes that CCAMLR’s full 
objection procedure has never been activated.197 However, objection procedures evidently 
have the potential to compromise effective decision-making. They can undermine the 
conservation effect of a decision where unilateral measures are taken. Additionally, by 
reducing the acceptability of adopted measures to other RFMO members, their use can 
generate division and disputes that undermine co-operation. It is thus important that 
RFMOs design objection procedures that mitigate these risks, and ensure that “any post[-
]objection behaviour is consistent with other general obligations of state parties”.198  
 
V Reforming RFMO Decision-Making: Suggested Best Practice  
Thus far this paper has illustrated how problems involving two key components of RFMO 
decision-making processes can hamper effectiveness. Even before arriving at the problems 
of State compliance and enforcement, consensus-based decision-making and objection 
procedures can combine to produce a decision with limited conservation effect. That is, if 
a decision is made at all.  
 
Any solutions to the problems confronting RFMO decision-making have to carefully 
balance the need to respect state sovereignty whilst ensuring robust and timely decisions 
are made. As Meltzer has put it, a “central tension characterizing international fisheries 
organizations is the need for balancing state sovereignty with the obligation to cooperate 
within an RFMO”.199  On one hand, there is little the law of the sea can do to compel 
recalcitrant states to adopt more robust conservation and enforcement measures. Indeed, 
"without the will to agree, the details of the decision-making procedures may make little 
  
196 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 58-62.  
197 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.5]. 
198 At 194.  
199 Meltzer, above n 14, at XXXIX.   
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difference".200 On the other hand, the design of RFMO decision-making can help ensure 
meaningful decisions, that are consistent with the law of the sea, will be adopted.201  
 
This section will identify RFMO measures that are seen as best practice solutions to the 
problems confronting objection procedures and consensus-based decision-making. 
However, in discharging their duty of co-operation through RFMOs, the FSA does not 
require States to apply a specific form of decision-making procedure.202 It only requires 
decision-making be “timely and effective”.203 Therefore, this framework will be sourced 
from the recommendations of the Chatham House Panel as well as developments with 
RFMOs themselves that are most likely to achieve the criteria for effective decision-
making. In turn, this advice on RFMO best practice will be used to help evaluate whether 
SPRFMO can serve as a model for other RFMOs.  
A Decision-Making: Requisite Support  
There is tension when it comes to defining best practice decision-adoption procedures. On 
one hand, unanimity or mandatory consensus-based decision-making may be the best way 
of ensuring support for a decision.204 Conversely, it is open to abuse and is thus arguably 
not the best process for achieving ‘effective decisions’. Therefore, the challenge, as stated 
by McDorman,: 205 
 
is to encourage the "best" outcomes that enlist as many States as possible as supporters 
and, most importantly, engage the support of the States with the most interest in the 
outcomes. 
 
In light of these potentially conflicting objectives, best practice is to find a balance between 
the benefits of consensus and decisiveness of majority voting.  
1 Aim for Consensus  
Firstly, a best practice RFMO should aim to encourage consensus. As was noted in the 
context of CCAMLR, the requirement for consensus brought:206  
  
200 Judith Swan Decision-Making in Regional Fisheries Bodies or Arrangements: The Evolving Role of RFBS 
and International Agreement on Decision-Making Processes (FAO, Fisheries Circular No. 995, 2004) at 9.   
201 Ceo et al., above n 142, at 90.  
202 Henriksen et al., above n 48, at 204.   
203FSA, art 10(j).  
204 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 40-41.  
205 McDorman, above n 38, at [12].  
206 Ceo et al., above n 142, at 68.  
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a strong sense of cooperation and in most cases compromises had been reached on 
matters of difference. It has also helped to adopt a serious negotiating effort and to 
create a better climate for the respect and self-enforcement of decisions. 
 
The fact consensus helps to build co-operation gives it the edge over majority-based voting 
methods. Voting may promote timeliness, but this has limited value if parties do not agree 
or if it creates divisiveness in the organisation. Consensus is also slightly more flexible 
than unanimity, as parties do not have to express a position in favour or against for a 
measure to pass.207 Therefore, as consensus promotes both co-operation and decision 
acceptability, and thereby better self-enforcement, it is a goal all RFMOs should explicitly 
aim for in their decision-making.208  
2  Consensus Should be Supported by Majority Voting  
Whilst the FAO may recommend consensus for “decisions possessing normative and 
regulatory effects”, on balance, it is important that the process allows for decisions to be 
made where consensus cannot be reached.209As has been discussed above, with a strict 
unanimity or consensus requirement, all it takes is for one member State to take issue with 
a decision and the whole process can grind to a halt. Hence the Chatham House Panel’s 
blunt description of a unanimity or consensus requirement as “not best practice”.210  
Therefore an RFMO’s decision procedure should allow for a majority vote where 
consensus is not able to be achieved. This process can act as a form of “circuit breaker” if 
a decision is being blocked by a small minority of States.211    
 
The main advantage of a vote based system is that “the issue is resolved at a specific point 
in time” and it allows a decision to be finally taken. 212  No one member is able to derail 
the process.213 However, majority voting does come with downsides. It can create division 
amongst an RFMO’s members as well as encourage the use of objection procedures. 
Moreover, a State that is bound by a decision to which it did not agree may be less likely 
to self-enforce that ruling.214 Another disadvantage may be discouraging States from 
  
207 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3].  
208 At [8.4.4.2].  
209 Ceo et al. above n 142, at 69.  
210 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 73.  
211 At 40.  
212 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3]  
213 Meltzer, above n 14, at [8.4.3]  
214 At [8.4.4.2]; and Pinto, above n 4, at 129.  
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becoming members, particularly coastal states who feel they may be out-voted by distant 
water fishing states in an RFMO.215  
 
The disadvantages of majority voting mean that the ‘circuit-breaker’ procedure should 
require more than a simple majority (that is 50 per cent plus one) to pass decisions. 216 The 
experience of NAFO illustrates why. The NAFO Convention provides that all conservation 
and management decisions only require a simple majority to pass.217 This was combined 
with an objection process that allows States to easily opt-out of measures.218 Historically, 
it appears decisions failed to enlist the support of members and build co-operation. This 
led to widespread use of objection procedures, and an ineffective conservation regime.219 
NAFO has consequently agreed to introduce consensus-based decision-making combined 
with a stricter objection process, however the amendment treaty has yet to enter into 
force.220 Furthermore, even if one took the objection procedure out of the simple majority 
equation, the concern is that conservation measures may simply be ignored by States. 221 
Joyner stated this would have occurred had CCAMLR used majority decision-making in 
its early years.222 Moreover, consensus-based decision-making was probably an important 
inducement for States to join the regime in the first place.223  
 
In light of the problems with simply majority decision-making, the required majority 
should be significantly higher than a simple majority. This should certainly be the case for 
decisions around setting the TAC and the allocation of the TAC. This is because the “more 
State-sensitive a decision … the more important is direct state consent”.224 In fact, the 
WCPFC has a ‘consensus list’ that requires the most sensitive conservation and 
management measures to be made by consensus.225 This includes the setting of a TAC as 
well as fishing effort levels.226 All other measures are can be pass by a three-quarters 
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majority. However, Henriksen et al. note the measures added to the ‘consensus list’ were 
obviously put there because they were contentious. “This is precisely why submitting them 
to decision-making by consensus may hamper the future effectiveness of the WCPFC”.227 
Therefore, in line with the Chatham House Panel’s recommendations, all substantive 
decisions should require a two-thirds majority for adoption, rising to three-quarters if the 
RFMO has more than 12 members.228 This ensures that an RFMO can still make decisions 
if they enjoy widespread support. 
 
Additionally, it is important to underscore that disagreement should not automatically 
result in a majority vote. In fact, due to the benefits of consensus, this should ideally be the 
last course of action. The Chatham House Panel recommended that there should be a 
presiding officer who ensures there is no premature recourse to voting.229 Moreover, before 
a vote is called, the Panel noted that the use of a neutral conciliator can be a helpful way of 
helping guide parties to a consensus.230  
3  Alternative Solutions 
Realistically, there will continue to be RFMOs that require mandatory consensus for 
conservation and management decisions. For example, in smaller RFMOs such as CCSBT 
there may be little alterative to consensus based decision-making, unless there is a very 
liberal objection procedure.231 The Chatham House Panel therefore suggests that RFMOs 
with less than four members make decisions on the basis of consensus, but grant a 
disaffected member the right to have the decision reviewed by a panel if they do not object 
to the decision being made.232 This is to mitigate the veto problem.  Another method that 
can be adopted, is allowing a conciliator to be appointed that can try and resolve any 
disputes.233 The Chatham House Panel stated this was often effective to preventing 
deadlock.234 However, the downside of this method is that a conciliator cannot compel 
agreement. A single State can still block the decision-making process.   
 
If consensus is a bottom-line for an RFMO’s members, the Convention’s decision-making 
criteria can also work to ensure measures have a certain conservation effect. It can 
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introduce minimum standards such as “harvest controls, precautionary reference points, 
and other science-based decision rules … can serve as the lowest common denominator to 
ensure the sustainability of the stocks. These standards can act as a default position” if 
agreement cannot be reached.235 One example of this is in the CCBSP Convention. If 
parties cannot agree to a TAC, then the Convention prescribes the levels at which the TAC 
must be set at, depending on the biomass of Alaskan Pollock. 236 This helps to ensure the 
continuity of the management regime even where deadlock exists.  
 
Strict consensus or unanimity may also be necessary to satisfy coastal states that they will 
not be outvoted by distant water fishing states “that more aggressively pursue commercial 
stocks”.237 This is evidently the case with the South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
(SEAFO) and the CCBSP.238 However, as with smaller RFMOs, there is still a strong case 
for provisions to mitigate the effect of a hold-out State on the decision-making process. 
Moreover, the use of chamber voting can help alleviate coastal State concerns.239 In the 
WCPFC substantive decisions must be taken not only by a three-quarters majority of 
member States, but a three-quarters majority of the 14 members of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Fisheries Agency.240 This forms the body of relevant coastal states. A system where 
there is overall majority voting, but a requirement for all coastal States to consent, would 
be arguably superior to strict consensus voting. However, a coastal State veto may risk 
discouraging distant water fishing States from participating.  
4 Summary   
Best practice is for RFMO decision-adoption procedures is to strike a balance by 
combining a consensus requirement with majority voting. This recognises that, whilst 
consensus is desirable for decision-acceptability and participation, it may not always be 
possible to achieve complete support for a decision. In order to avoid the impacts that 
vetoes and deadlocks can have on conservation-orientation and timeliness, a best practice 
RFMO should allow decisions to be adopted with a significant majority as a last resort. 
However, as will be discussed below, it is important to combine this with a robust objection 
procedure. This in order to accommodate dissenting views and to encourage RFMO 
membership and participation.  
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B Objection Procedures 
The main focus for improving objection procedures has been “efforts made to qualify 
RFMO objections procedures to ensure that the conservation regime for these stocks is not 
undermined by unilateral action” 241 This recognises the reality that objection procedures 
allow States to protect themselves against decisions they believe are adverse to their 
interests.242 Realistically, they are therefore needed for States to fully accept RFMOs. This 
is all the more so if an RFMO does not have a strict consensus or unanimity requirement, 
thereby removing the ability for a single State to veto a decision. Furthermore, Schiffman 
argues that:243  
 
there is ample evidence … to indicate that exemptive provisions are helpful, if not 
necessary to “widen the tent” of conservation and management organizations and 
accommodate a variety of interests within the regime. This includes the differing 
interests of coastal and distant water fishing states, developed and developing states, 
new entrants to a regime as well as traditional consumers of a resource  
 
The challenge is therefore not to remove objections from decision-making procedures, but 
to ensure they are designed so that they promote, rather than undermine, effective 
conservation and management measures.  
1 The Middle Ground Approach:  
Both accepting the need for objection procedures whilst also ensuring they are not abused 
by States leads to what Pinto calls the “middle ground approach”.244  The elements of this 
approach arguably represent current best practice for RFMOs.245The ‘middle ground’ 
includes a “combination of conditions for grounds of objection; restriction of objection 
procedures to a number of subjects within the convention, recourse to binding dispute 
resolution and settlement procedures; and the reversal of the burden on the objecting 
State”.246 Other requirements that fit with this approach are a requirement for reasoned 
objections as well as an alternative unilateral programme that does not undermine the 
conservation regime.247  
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The example of a middle ground approach used by Pinto is the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Organization (WCPFC).248 Whilst not an “explicit objection procedure”, its 
process for reviewing decisions has several core elements common to newer objection 
procedures.249 Therefore it is still a worthy example of middle ground approach. 
 
The WCPFC’s decision-making process first aims to achieve consensus, but allows for 
questions of substance to be taken by a three-quarters majority where consensus is 
unachievable.250 Certain matters, such as the establishment of the TAC must always be 
decided by consensus.251 If a participant objects to a decision taken by consensus, then that 
objection is submitted to a conciliator to try and reconcile differences and achieve 
consensus on the decision.252 However, if a decision is made by a majority vote, those 
States who voted against or where absent have 30 days to initiate a panel process that will 
review the decision.253 There are only two available grounds for review. Firstly, the 
decision is inconsistent the WCPFC Convention, the UNCLOS or the FSA. Secondly, the 
decision unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact against the member concerned. 254  
 
If the panel considers that the decision does not need to be modified or revoked, it becomes 
binding on all members.255 However, if it finds the decision needs to be modified or 
changed, the WCPFC Commission is required, at its next annual meeting, to modify the 
decision so that it conforms to the Panel’s recommendations.256 It may also revoke the 
decision.257 A special meeting can also be called to do this.258  
 
Schiffman contends that the combination of a review panel and conciliator not only protects 
the interests of member States, but also helps safeguard conservation objectives.259 
However, for a middle ground approach the WCPFC is quite strict on ‘objecting’ States. 
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McDorman notes the grounds for review are very narrow. 260 If they do not prove either 
non-compliance with international law or discrimination, the State is bound by the decision. 
This is unless the special meeting modifies the decision so the objecting State is no longer 
to subject to it. 261  Whilst the procedure protects a decision’s coherence and conservation-
orientation, it can undermine decision acceptability, particularly as the State would not 
have actually voted for the decision. Moreover, this could discourage membership of the 
RFMO which would weaken the potency of the decision-making regime. As such, strict 
objection procedures present risks to decision-making efficacy.  
2 Limited Grounds for Objection  
Whilst the WCPFC may present some concerns when measured against McDorman’s 
criteria as well as the goal of wide participation, its core elements are largely consistent 
with the Chatham House Panel’s advice on RFMO objection procedures.262 The first of 
these is that there should be limited grounds for entering an objection.263  
 
The Chatham House Panel recommends that objections should be reasoned and based on 
the same two grounds as WCPFC review process: inconsistency with international law and 
unjustified discrimination.264  This acknowledges that there are legitimate reasons why a 
State may want to object to a decision.265 Additionally, by stating what these are, it narrows 
the scope of for States to abuse the procedure, and allows for the objection to be scrutinised 
by other States.266 It guarantees States cannot legally object if the decision is consistent 
with international law and does not constitute unjustified discrimination against a State.267 
States participation and acceptability is still encouraged as they are still afforded a degree 
of protection from decisions with which they disagree.  
3  Review Panels 
The Chatham House Panel also recommends that when an objection is submitted, a panel 
of independent experts “shall review the objection without delay and report its conclusions 
to the appropriate organ of the RFMO”.268 If the panel endorses the decision, it should 
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come into effect and be implemented by all members.269 If it upholds the objection, the 
RFMO should urgently reconsider the decision and make a new decision. Any objections 
to this should be “submitted to the RFMO”s procedures for the settlement of disputes”.270 
It also suggests panels should have the power to establish interim measures.271  
 
Review panels are arguably a critical part of decision-making best practice. They have 
become increasingly popular amongst RFMOs.272 “By submitting to a timely and fair 
dispute process, States give effect to their dual duties to cooperate and to conserve and 
cannot use the inability to agree as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation 
and management action”.273 Incorporating a review panel into the objection procedure also 
helps prevents disputes from escalating, which could further decelerate the decision-
making process and thereby threaten conservation effect. Moreover, it provides a relatively 
quick method for assessing whether an objection is justified.274 This helps to overcome the 
problem of identifying whether a State’s objection is consistent with the treaty regime or 
not.275  It is therefore important to integrate some form of review panel type process into 
the objection procedure. 
4  Interim and Alternative Measures:  
One aspect missing from WCPFO’s procedures is an express requirement to adopt interim 
or alternative measures while the objection is being resolved. The Chatham House Panel 
recommends that the objecting State should not be able to take action that could 
compromise the sustainability of stocks or undermine the objection procedure itself.276 This 
reiterates calls by the 2006 Fish Stocks Review Conference that States should:277 
 
Ensure that post opt-out behavior is constrained by rules to prevent opting out parties 
from undermining conservation, clear processes for dispute resolution, and a 
description of alternative measures that will be implemented in the interim. 
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Interim and alternative measures are therefore an important method for preventing States 
from taking damaging unilateral action, thereby helping to preserve the conservation-effect 
of the original decision.278  A requirement for an objecting State to propose and implement 
alternative measures, therefore, arguably represents best practice. 
 
Disappointingly, as Table Two illustrates (above) few RFMO conventions oblige States to 
develop such measures. With SEAFO, one of the more modern RFMOS, they are at least 
a possibility.279 If a member objects to a decision then it is prima-facie non-binding in 
respect of that member.280 They do have to provide reasons and, “where appropriate”, 
proposals for alternative measures that it will implement.281 However, if any member 
requires a meeting in response to the objection, then one is held to review the measure.282 
If this occurs any SEAFO member can then request the establishment of an ad hoc expert 
panel to make recommendations on interim measures.283 If all non-objecting members 
agree that the long-term sustainability of relevant fish stocks would be undermined in 
absence of interim measures, the expert panel’s recommendations become binding on the 
objecting State.284  
 
With SEAFO, there are several hoops to jump through before interim measures can become 
binding on an objecting State. However, its process at least requires that State to consider 
implementing alternative measures. Moreover, the possibility of binding interim measures 
provides a degree security that the conservation effect of a decision will not be undermined 
if the objection threatens the long-term sustainability of a fish stock.285  
5  Alternative Solutions  
Other RFMOs have also developed milder methods for mitigating the negative effects of 
objection procedures. In the International Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Tunas (ICCAT), an objection by less than one quarter of its members has no effect unless 
they reaffirm that objection within 60 days.286 The requirement for reaffirmation “indicates 
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a degree of added pressure on those states choosing to avail themselves of the objection 
procedure when they are in a relatively small minority”.287 It also has effect of discouraging 
“other states from immediately filing additional objections”.288 An even simpler 
requirement, is requiring a State to provide written reasons for an objection and a 
description of any alternative measures it will take instead.289 This is used by SEAFO as 
the first stage in its review process, but even on its own it  arguably “forces the State to 
exercise a much greater degree of care” before they use an exemption.290 
 
Another innovation proposed by Schiffman is to require an RFMO’s scientific committee 
to report on the environmental impact of an objection within a prescribed time period.291 
This would be where the exemption contemplates greater fish consumption.292 He contends 
that this would expose those States intending to unilaterally object to greater scrutiny and 
possible criticism.293 This would, as with re-affirmation, put further pressure on States to 
refrain from using the objection procedure. There is, however, the risk the scientific 
committee could become politicised, or would be unwilling to make clear-cut decisions in 
light of scientific uncertainty.294   
6  Summary  
Overall, there are a variety of processes available to an RFMO to help control the use and 
effect of objections. A best practice approach combines limited grounds for objection, a 
requirement that those grounds be justified before a review panel, and measures to ensure 
the conservation effect of a decision cannot be undermined. This strikes a balance between 
preserving the conservation effect of a decision, encouraging State membership, ensuring 
the objection is resolved in a timely manner, and preserving the acceptability of the 
decision to all parties.   
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VI SPRFMO: A Model for RFMO Decision-Making?  
One of the disconcerting conclusions of the Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly study was that “the 
effect of RFMO management on the stocks they control has, so far, been negligible”.295 As 
RFMOs are the sole institutions with the power to make multilateral conservation and 
management measures for high seas stocks, it is highly important that solutions be found.296 
From the perspective of high seas fish stock sustainability, the consequences of maintaining 
the status quo are simply unacceptable.    
 
SPRFMO incorporates new processes that ‘raise the bar’ for RFMO decision-making, 
thereby offering a possible solution to problems affecting other RFMO decision-making 
processes.297 Indeed, an evaluation of its decision-making processes will show that it does 
meet RFMO best practice, incorporating many of the elements identified as necessary for 
effective decision-making. Importantly, SPRFMO not only meets the normative 
framework for effective decision-making developed in this paper; its decision-making 
procedures have also operated successfully in practice. The organisation has recently had 
to contend with a major dispute with a significant member State. This has put its cutting 
edge objection procedure to the test.298 This challenge has shown some short-comings with 
SPRFMO, but nonetheless shows the promise of its decision-making processes for other 
RFMOs.  
A SPFMO Background 
Established by the 2009 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas 
Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, SPRFMO came into formal operation in 
2012 and is one of the world’s newest regional fisheries body.299 Its enormous area of 
responsibility includes the high seas stretching from the South-West of Australia to the 
western side of South America.300 It has the competence to make conservation and 
management measures for both straddling and highly migratory stocks, as well as discrete 
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high seas fish stocks.301  SPRFMO currently has 13 members,302 as well as six co-operating 
non-contracting parties.303  Article two of the Convention gives its objective as:304  
 
through the application of the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach to 
fisheries management, to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
fishery resources and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems in which those 
resources occur. 
 
Negotiations towards the SPRFMO Convention began in 2006 at the initiative of Australia, 
New Zealand and Chile. The aim was to address a regulatory gap for several fish stocks in 
the high seas of the South Pacific.305 The two fish stocks of primary concern are the 
straddling stock of Chilean jack mackerel (Jack mackerel), and the discrete high seas stock 
of orange roughy. Both of these fish stocks present major challenges to SPRFMO.306 Jack 
mackerel stocks have declined rapidly in recent decades, whereas orange roughy stocks 
present their own unique issues.307 Not only is it particularly vulnerable to overfishing, as 
a slow growing and long living species, it is also harvested using bottom trawling.  This 
practice is considered to be particularly damaging to the environment, with uncertainty 
over its long-term impacts on the deep ocean ecosystem.308  
  
As there was a significant period of time from the commencement of negotiations, to the 
entry into force of the SPRFMO Convention, the negotiating parties adopted voluntary and 
interim conservation and management measures from 2007 onwards. 309 This was both in 
an effort to control bottom trawling and to halt the rapid of decline of jack mackerel 
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stocks.310 However, arguably the delay around installing these interim measures was 
SPRFMO’s first set-back. By beginning negotiations towards an RFMO to regulate jack 
mackerel, “a scramble bordering on the edge of madness” was triggered.311 In order to 
improve their claims for future allocations of jack mackerel by SPRFMO, States increased 
fishing for the stock with new participants entering the fishery.312  
 
 
Figure Three: SPRFMO Convention Area (Source: SPRFMO www.southpacificrfmo.org)  
B Decision-Making Rules 
Perversely, as a result of the SPRFMO negotiations, a fish stock already under pressure, 
became more vulnerable to collapse. Arguably, it is therefore even more imperative that 
the SRPFMO succeed in turning around the fortunes of jack mackerel and orange roughy 
fish stocks. It is fortunate, therefore, that the decision-making rules in the SPRFMO 
Convention perform well against the best practice framework developed in this paper.  
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1 Requisite Majority  
SPRFMO’s governing convention first provides that as a general rule substantive decisions 
shall be taken by consensus.313 In contrast, procedural decisions are taken by a simple 
majority. As is typical with RFMOs, consensus is defined as the absence of a formal 
objection at the time the decision was made.314 However, Article 16 allows for the 
requirement for consensus to be avoided:315 
 
If the Chairperson considers that all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been 
exhausted:  
… 
(b)  decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by a three fourths majority of 
members of the commission casting affirmative or negative votes. 
 
Whether a decision is one of substance is in itself a decision of substance. Decisions on 
questions of substance then become binding on all SPRFMO participants 90 days after the 
decision is transmitted to SPRFMO participants by the head of its Secretariat.316 Therefore 
consensus is not necessary for the adoption of conservation and management measures by 
the SPRFMO Commission.317  
2 Objection Procedure  
SPRFMO members have the right to object to the Commission’s substantive decisions. The 
only exception to this is where a decision is adopted on an emergency basis. In that case 
the decision is binding on all members, subject to dispute resolution procedures, and no 
objections are allowed.318  
 
The design of the objection procedure puts a number of limits on its use. Firstly, an 
objection must be lodged within 60 days of the decision being transmitted to SPRFMO 
members.319 Then, at the same time as the objection is presented, Article 17 states that the 
objecting state must:320 
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(i) specify in detail the grounds for its objection;  
(ii) adopt alternative measures that are equivalent in effect to the decision to which it 
has objected and have the same date of application; and  
(iii) advise the Executive Secretary of the terms of such alternative measures.  
 
Moreover, there are only two grounds for objection. These are either that the decision 
unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact against the member, or that the decision is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the SPRFMO Convention or other relevant international 
law, as reflected in the UNCLOS and the FSA.321   
 
Additionally, an objection triggers an elaborate process for reviewing the substantive 
decision. Firstly, a Review Panel must be established within 30 days of the 60 day objection 
period ending.322 This Panel consists of three members selected from the FAO’s list of 
fisheries experts.323   Then within 45 days of its establishment, the Panel must report on:324  
 
whether the grounds specified for the objection presented by the member or members 
of the Commission are justified and whether the alternative measures adopted are 
equivalent in effect to the decision to which objection has been presented.  
 
The Panel thus has two key decisions to make. Exactly how it concludes on these two 
decisions can prompt a variety of different outcomes for the objecting State, and SPRFMO 
more broadly. Possibly the simplest outcome is if the Panel finds that the objector has been 
the subject of unjustified discrimination and, additionally, that the objecting State’s 
alternative measures are equivalent in effect to the original decision. In that case, the 
objector’s alternate measures become binding on the objector in substitution for the original 
decision.325   
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Matters become more complicated if the Panel finds discrimination against the objector, 
but also determines that the alternative members are not equivalent or need “specific 
modifications” to achieve equivalence:326  
 
a) If the Panel recommends “specific modifications”, the objector has 60 days to 
modify its measures or institute dispute resolution proceedings. Dispute 
resolution proceedings would ultimately entail compulsory dispute resolution 
under the Part XV of the Law of the Sea Convention, if it is not resolved by 
other processes.327 However, if it does choose to modify its measures, they 
become binding on the objector in place of the contested decision. 
b) If the Panel finds the objector’s alternative measures are not equivalent in effect 
to the substantive decision, the objector must either adopt the Panel’s 
recommended alternative measures within 60 days or institute dispute 
settlement proceedings. 328 If the recommended alternative measures are 
adopted, these become binding on the objector in substitution for the original 
decision. 329    
 
In both cases, the objector does has the right to also request an Extraordinary Meeting of 
the SPRFMO Commission.330 This must be done within 30 days the Panel’s decision, and 
must be convened within 45 days of the request. 331  The Extraordinary Meeting can 
confirm or modify the recommendations of the Review Panel, or it can even replace the 
substantive decision with a new or modified decision that will become binding on all 
commission members in accordance with the Convention’s decision-making rules.332 
  
An Extraordinary Meeting is automatic if the Panel finds the substantive decision is 
inconsistent with international law.333 The meeting must be held 45 days after the Panel’s 
decision, and it may decide to revoke, modify or confirm the contested decision.334 The 
  
326 See SPRMO Convention, Annex II para 10(b)-(c).  
327 Annex II para 10(c) and art 34; FSA, art 30; and UNCLOS, art 286.  
328 Annex II para 10(c).  
329 Annex II para 10(c).  
330 Annex II para 10(d).  
331 Annex II para 10(d).  
332 Annex II para 10(e).  
333 Annex II para 10(f).  
334 Annex II para 10(g).  
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objector than has another 45 days to implement the decision or institute the dispute 
resolution process provided for in the Convention.335  
 
Finally, the Panel could find that a decision neither discriminated against the objector nor 
is it inconsistent with international law. In this situation the objector has 45 days to either 
implement the decision or institute binding dispute resolution proceedings under the 
Convention.336 However, if the Panel determines that the objector’s alternative measures 
are equivalent in effect to the substantive measure, “the alternative measures shall be 
binding on the objecting member or members of the Commission in substitution for the 
decision pending confirmation of their acceptance by the Commission at its next 
meeting”.337 
 
Overall, with SPRFMO, not only can substantive decisions be taken otherwise than by 
consensus, but an objecting State is not permitted to completely ignore the decision. It must 
still implement equivalent measures.338 This significantly limits the scope for an objection 
to impact on the conservation effect of a decision.  
3 Preliminary Evaluation 
SPRFMO’s decision-making approach has been described by Mossop as “ground-
breaking.” 339 Schiffman describes the “attempt to subject objections to a form of 
multilateral review” as “innovative” and part of a broader trend with newer RFMOs to 
reduce the negative impact of objections on RFMO efficacy.340Moreover, SPRFMO’s 
decision-making process is in line with the best practice framework developed earlier in 
this paper. Thus, on paper, SPRFMO constitutes a model for RFMO decision-making best 
practice.  
 
Firstly, SPRFMO combines consensus-based decision-making with majority voting as a 
fall-back option. As SPRFMO has more than 12 members, it conforms to the suggested 
best practice for substantive RFMO decision-making.341 Any concerns that the absence of 
strict consensus for decision adoption might dissuade States from joining should be 
tempered by the fact most of the key States are already either members of SPRFMO or are 
  
335 Annex II para 10(h).   
336 Annex II para 10(i).  
337 Annex II para 10(j).  
338 Mossop, above n 99, at 338.  
339 At 338. 
340 Schiffman “The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization”, above n 16, at 212;  
341 Anderson et al., above n 9, at 124.  
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cooperating parties. One aspect of suggested best practice missing from the Convention is 
the use of a conciliator where consensus cannot be achieved. However, the Convention 
does make it clear that putting a decision to a majority vote is a matter of last resort.342 
Indeed, requiring one to be used every time there is deadlock might just further delay the 
decision-making process. Overall, SPRFMO’s decision-adoption approach is consistent 
with best practice.  
 
SPRFMO’s objection procedure also has many of the key elements identified as best 
practice in this area.  Firstly, there are limited grounds for objection. Secondly, alternative 
measures that do not undermine the conservation measure in question must be adopted by 
the objecting state. Finally, a review panel is automatically formed to rule on the legitimacy 
of the objection and the compatibility of the alternative measures.343  
 
The objection process provides for States to avoid being bound by decisions they believe 
are inconsistent with international law or constitute unjustified discrimination. These are 
legitimate grounds for using an objection and should therefore encourage State 
participation and decision acceptability whilst limiting the scope for the procedure to be 
abused. Moreover, the requirement alternative measures be implemented helps to preserve 
the effect of the original decision, whilst also giving the objecting State flexibility to 
establish their own unilateral measures, as long as they are equivalent in effect. Moreover, 
the Review Panel ensures that the legitimacy of every objection and the compatibility of 
the objecting State’s alternative measures are subject to third-party scrutiny.  This will 
hopefully discourage States from objecting unless they have genuine grounds for doing 
so.344 Altogether this will help to preserve the conservation effect of decisions, as well as 
the consistency of objections with the object and purpose of the SPRFMO Convention.  
 
One omission from the SPRFMO Convention is Schiffman’s suggestion that the Scientific 
Committee should analyse the conservation impact of an objection.345 This is of particular 
interest as the Convention requires an objecting State to adopt measures that are of 
equivalent effect to the original decision.346 As there will be a Review Panel assessing the 
equivalence of the alternative measures, it may be of assistance if there was advice from 
the Scientific Committee on the objection’s conservation impacts. However, considering 
  
342 SPRFMO Convention, art 16(2).  
343 Anderson et al, above n 9, at 124-125.  
344 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 201-202.  
345 At 211.  
346 SPRFMO Convention, art 17(2)(b)(ii).  
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the already tight timeframes to which a review panel has to operate, this would likely 
further slowdown the process and increase costs.  
 
Mossop has noted that SPRFMO’s decision-making processes “appear rather complicated, 
and have the potential to delay the proceedings of the Commission” if used regularly.347 
Repeated use of the objection process would also be costly, especially for the objecting 
member who has to bear 70 per cent of expenses associated with the Review Panel.348 One 
possibility is that these factors could dissuade members from objecting.349 However, 
“another possibility is that the parties will become enmeshed in lengthy disputes”.350 Whilst 
there are clear time frames in place, there is the possibility of an objector going through 
practically the whole Panel process, then deciding to opt for binding dispute resolution 
procedures. Binding dispute resolution would still produce a final outcome, but would add 
even more time and cost to the process. One therefore hopes the use of this procedure 
remains the exception, rather than then norm. Otherwise the impacts on timeliness and 
member co-operation will be detrimental to the effectiveness of the process.  
 
The risks associated with SPRFMO’s objection procedure are arguably the cost of ensuring 
decision acceptability in an RFMO where decisions can be taken without consensus. 
Moreover, in light of the already strict conditions placed on objections, it would have 
arguably been overly burdensome for the negotiating parties to circumscribe the objection 
procedure further.351 Therefore SPRFMO has struck a reasonable compromise between 
decision acceptability, timeliness and conservation orientation. It also incorporates most of 
the elements identified as decision making best practice. Altogether this means that, on 
paper, SPRFMO certainly provides a model for effective RFMO decision-making. Indeed, 
in many respects, it reads like the incarnation of the Chatham House Panel’s model RFMO.  
 
SPRFMO’s on paper assessment is further boosted by other aspects of its decision-making 
rules. It incorporates clear, modern criteria and principles for adopting conservation and 
management measures.352 Interestingly, these criteria include a minimum standard for 
decision-making. Article 4(3) provides that its initial decisions shall take account of and 
  
347 Mossop, above n 99, at 338.  
348 SPRFMO Convention, annex II para 7(a).  
349 Mossop, above n 99, at 338.  
350 At 338    
351 Meltzer, above n 14, at 194.  
352 Mossop, above n 99, at 336; Schiffman “The Evolution of Fisheries Management”, above n 32, at 183-
183; SPRFMO Convention, arts 3 and 20-22.  
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not undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management measures established by 
relevant coastal states and the SPRFMO members.353 Whilst not a default position that can 
operate where the requisite majority cannot be reached, it does institutionalise a benchmark 
which all SPRFMO parties are obliged to account for in making decisions.354 This should, 
initially at least, help protect the conservation effect of SPRFMO’s decisions.  
 
The SPRFMO Convention also provides that conservation and management measures 
should be compatible between jurisdictions,355 and even permits the organisations to make 
measures for areas within national jurisdiction with the consent of the relevant State.356 
Moreover, Article 18 requires the SPRFMO Commission to promote transparency in its 
decision-making processes.357 It states representatives from non-Contracting States, 
International Organisations and NGOs should be able to observe Commission meetings 
and have access to relevant information.358 This should allow SPRFMO’s members to be 
held accountable for any poor decisions. Altogether, when these elements are combined 
with the SPRFMO’s decision-making process, this should help ensure its Commission 
makes effective decisions. Of course, whether this will ultimately be the case in practice is 
dependent on the political will of its members.359   
C Case Study: SPRFMO in Light of the Russia Objection  
SPRFMO performs well when its decision-making rules are assessed against this paper’s 
theoretical RFMO best practice framework. However, only two years into its formal 
existence, it is too early to assess SPRFMO’s effectiveness in achieving its objective of 
long-term fish stock sustainability. Yet, within months of the SPRFMO Convention 
entering into force, its decision-making procedures have had to overcome a significant 
hurdle. In April 2013 Russia objected to the first set of conservation and management 
measures adopted by SPRFMO.360 As a result SPRFMO’s review panel process was 
triggered. The outcomes of this dispute provide an opportunity to comment on SPRFMO 
  
353 SPRFMO Convention, art 4(3).  
354 Meltzer, above n 14, at 197-198.  
355 SPRFMO Convention, art 4.  
356 Art 20.   
357 Schiffman “The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization”, above n 16, at 212; and 
SRPFMO Convention, art 18(1).  
358 SPRFMO Convention, art 18(2)-(4).  
359 Mossop, above n 99, at 339.  
360 Russian Federation Federal Agency for Fisheries “Letter of Objection to Conservation and Management 
Measure 1.01” (19 April 2013) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
<www.southpacificrfmo.org>.  
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and its “ground breaking” decision-making process.361 This will conclude that this process 
has ultimately strengthened the organisation, demonstrating that its unique decision-
making and objection procedures can operate successfully. This further reinforces the 
contention that SPRFMO can act as a model for RFMO reform.  
1  Factual Background:  
On 1 February 2013, the first meeting of the SPRFMO Commission adopted Conservation 
and Management Measure 1.01 (CMM 1.01).362 CMM 1.01 set the 2013 TAC of jack 
mackerel. It followed a series of annual jack mackerel interim conservation measures 
aimed at halting the dramatic decline of this fish stock.363 The TAC was set at 360,000 
tonnes for both the SPRFMO Convention area and fisheries under Chilean jurisdiction.364 
None of the TAC was allocated to Russia.365  
 
The Working Group that drafted CMM 1.01 decided that the 2013 TAC for jack mackerel 
should be allocated on the basis of each party’s share of the 2010 jack mackerel catch.366 
The data supplied to the Working Group did not contain the 2010 jack mackerel catch 
information supplied by Russia to the then SPRFMO Interim Secretariat.367 Russia 
therefore received a zero allocation of the 2013 TAC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
361 Mansfield, above n 16.   
362 Review Panel, above n 310, at [48]-[49]  
363 Mansfield, above n 15, 361.  
364 Review Panel, above n 310, at 13.  
365 At [49].  
366 Review Panel, above n 310, at [50]. 
367 At [46].  
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Figure Three: Jack Mackerel Allocation in CMM 1.01 (Source: SPRFMO 
www.southpacificrfmo.org)  
 
The cause of Russia’s exclusion from the official 2010 SPRFMO catch data was a dispute 
between Russia and the Interim Secretariat over a vessel named the Lafayette. In 2007, due 
to declining jack mackerel stocks, the parties negotiating the SPRFMO Convention agreed 
to report catch data to an Interim Secretariat amongst other interim conservation and 
management measures.368 In 2009 Russia advised that the Lafayette was fishing in the 
Convention area, and data was reported accordingly.369  However, in 2010, 2011 and 2012 
the Interim Secretariat was provided with information that the Lafayette was not capable 
of fishing, and was a processing vessel.370 Moreover, the reported catch for the Lafayette 
in 2010 was 41,315 tonnes, with Peru claiming 31,275 tonnes had been transhipped from 
its vessels to the Lafayette.371  
 
  
368 Review Panel, above n 310, at [18]-[19].  
369 At [27].  
370 At 8-10.  
371 At [38]-[39]. 
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The situation with the Lafayette caused several SPRFMO members to voice concerns over 
double counting of the catch data.372 As a result of these concerns, the Interim Secretariat 
excluded Russia’s catch from the Lafayette from their 2010 total catch data. This was 
“pending receipt of operational fishing information”.373 Unfortunately for Russia, it had 
only supplied aggregated annual catch data in 2010 in respect of the Lafayette. The meant 
it now had a total jack mackerel catch for 2010 of zero in SPRFMO’s official data.374   
2  Russia’s Objection  
Although this is not made explicit in the decision or Review Panel documents, CMM 1.01 
appears to have been adopted by consensus.375 However, in response Russia decided to 
make use of the objection procedure, filing an objection within 60 days of being notified 
of the decision by the SPRFMO Commission.376 As a result, a Review Panel was then 
formed in in May, 2013.377 Russia’s grounds for objection were that the CMM 1.01 
allocation decision both unjustifiably discriminated against Russia in form or fact, and that 
the decision was inconsistent with the SPRFMO Convention.378 Its alternative equivalent 
measures were to allocate itself a share of the 2013 jack mackerel TAC equal to its 2010 
share of the catch.379  
 
Several SPRFMO members submitted against Russia. They argued that SPRFMO was 
justified in excluding it from the 2010 data and that the decision was consistent with 
international law.380 Moreover, New Zealand expressed concerns that Russia’s alternative 
measures were not equivalent in effect to CM 1.01 and that Russia’s measures could 
undermine the already allocated TAC.381  
  
372 Review Panel, above n 310, at [40].  
373 At [46].  
374 At [46].  
375 See SPRFMO Commission Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus Murphyi (SPRFMO, 
CMM 1.01, 2013).  
376 Russian Federation Federal Agency for Fisheries, above n 360.  
377 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation “Establishment of Review Panel” (21 May 
2013) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation <www.southpacificrfmo.org>. 
378 Review Panel, above n 310, at [53].  
379 At [53].  
380 At 16-20.  
381 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Memorandum of New Zealand to the Review Panel” 
(21 June 2013) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation <www.southpacificrfmo.org> at 
[18]-[19].  
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3 The Panel’s Decision 
This panel reported its findings on 5 July 2013, just within the 45 day timeframe set by the 
Convention.382 It concluded that Russia had been unjustifiably discriminated against in the 
Commission’s allocation decision.383 The Panel found that the failure to allocate Russia 
any of the TAC was unintentional.384 Additionally, it said it was not provided with 
sufficient information to assess what portion of the Lafayette’s reported catch was from 
non-Peruvian vessels.385 Furthermore, the Panel stated none of the submitting States had 
presented a convincing argument as to why Russia should be denied a share of the TAC. 
This was particularly anomalous when parties who may have entered the fishery after the 
Convention was negotiated were accorded potential windfall allocations.386 Russia was 
thus subject to unjustified discrimination.387  
 
The Panel did not agree with Russia on the other aspects of its objection. It found that 
CMM 1.01 was compatible with the SPRFMO Convention and other law of the sea 
instruments.388 Moreover, it found Russia’s alternate measures were not equivalent in 
effect to the decision it was objecting to.389 Russia had promised not to exceed the TAC.390 
However, accommodating Russia within the TAC would have affected the allocations of 
other parties, meaning its measures lacked equivalence with CM 1.01.391 The Panel 
therefore recommended its own alternative measure. This sought to “avoid any 
inconsistency not only with the [TAC] but also with the allocations to other members and 
[co-operating non-contracting parties]”.392 This measure allowed Russia to fish for jack 
mackerel, but only if SPRFMO confirmed the TAC of 360,000 tonnes would likely not be 
met in 2013. It also required Russia to stop fishing once SPRMFO reported that the TAC 
has been reached.393  
 
  
382 Review Panel, above n 310, at [100]. 
383 At [100].  
384 At [91]. 
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Just over one month after the Panel reported its findings, SPRFMO announced that Russia 
had “confirmed its commitment to follow the recommendations made by the Panel”.394 
Consequently, in accordance with Annex II of the SPRFMO Convention, the recommended 
alternative measures were now binding on Russia in substitution for CMM 1.01.395 The 
Panel process therefore successfully resolved this objection dispute.  
5 Evaluation of SPRFMO in Light of the Russia Dispute  
In his address to the Review Panel SPRFMO’s Chairperson said it was “very important” 
that the Convention get “off to a good start”.396 This was both in order to unify the 
SPRFMO member States “in support of the objective of the Convention” and to encourage 
others to join.397 Arguably the objection process did just that. Moreover, it demonstrated 
that a complex objection procedure can operate to successfully resolve a dispute as well as 
promote effective decision-making.  
 
Firstly, the successful conclusion of the Panel process and Russia’s commitment to follow 
the Panel’s recommended alternative sets an important precedent. This is not only as an 
important affirmation of the Convention’s objection procedure, but also as a step forward 
in cementing a rules based order for the South Pacific fisheries. Furthermore, the Panel 
process can also be seen as a positive step forward for transparent and timely decision-
making. The Panel was able to successfully operate to a well-defined and tight timeframe. 
Indeed, it was deliberately drafted to achieve this, thereby avoiding drawn-out disputes that 
have undermined the decision-making efficacy of other RFMOs.398  The Panel process also 
resulted in the publicising of detailed member positions on the objection as well as a wealth 
of material on SPRFMO’s operations.399 This has shed greater light into the organisation 
and into its decision-making.  
 
The objection and Panel process has not been entirely positive. The process would have 
been resource consuming and probably divisive for SPRFMO and its members, as well as 
creating uncertainty around the finality and integrity of its decisions. Fortunately, the 
  
394 South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation “Russian Federation Accepts 
Recommendations” South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (7 August 2013) < 
www.sprmfo.int>.  
395 SPRFMO Convention, annex II para 10(b); and SPRFMO 2013 Annual Report (SPRFMO, 2014) at 2.  
396 Mansfield, above n 16, at 1.  
397 At 1.  
398 At 1.  
399 See SPRFMO “Supporting Material to the Information Paper for the Review Panel” (SPRFMO, June 
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Panel’s alternative measures sought both to minimise the likelihood of the TAC being 
exceeded and another participant’s allocation being effectively re-allocated to Russia. In 
this instance, any negative sentiment regarding any reallocation should have been tempered 
by the finding that Russia was unjustifiably discriminated against by CMM 1.01. 
Fortuitously, the concerns expressed by New Zealand to the Panel did not come to pass. It 
appears that the 2013 TAC was not exceeded, with Russia not reporting any fishing for 
jack mackerel in 2013. 400 
 
It is difficult to see how the Panel could have come up with a different solution to the catch 
allocation conundrum it faced. A more restrictive equivalent measure would have 
effectively denied Russia any share of the TAC. Conversely, a more generous alternative 
measure would have had to trade-off either a larger TAC or a re-allocation of catch quota 
within the TAC. Either way decision acceptability or conservation-effect would have been 
undermined. Logically, it must therefore have reached the right conclusion on this matter. 
Additionally, this will likely set a precedent for how States are to set alternative measures 
when they dispute a catch allocation.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a scientific report 
would have materially assisted the Panel in this particular dispute. Whilst the Panel said it 
was not supplied with sufficient information to determine the source of the Lafayette’s non-
Peruvian catch, the issues around the accuracy of the data appeared to be more political 
than scientific.  
 
From a policy perspective, the substantive decision of the Panel was also arguably the right 
one. At the hearing, Russia was described by the Chairperson of the Commission as:401  
 
a major State with a significant historical connection to fishing for jack mackerel in 
the Pacific as well as more recent activity in the fishery … It actively participated from 
the beginning in the Consultations that resulted in the adoption of the Convention 
 
Whilst the situation with Russia’s reported data was undesirable, a zero allocation to a 
major participant in SPRFMO, without that State’s consent, had the potential to damage 
the future effectiveness of the organisation. Indeed, the failure to account for Russia’s 
position suggests the decision-making criteria was flawed. Game theory suggests that for 
RFMO players to behave cooperatively, “they need to be assured now and in the future of 
  
400SPRFMO “Data Submitted to the SPRFMO Secretariat: 5th March 2014” (March 2014) SPRFMO 
<www.sprfmo.int> at 8. 
401Mansfield, above n 16, at 7. 
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an economic return from cooperation at least as great as it would by acting 
competitively”.402 In particular, “all must see the allocations as equitable”.403 An allocation 
of zero to a state with a genuine interest in the fishery arguably fails both these conditions. 
If a member believes an allocation is unfair, then it might leave that organisation or decide 
not to constructively participate in its processes.  
 
If SPRFMO is to be effective in the long-term it needs a wide participation and the good 
will and co-operation of those participants.404 A finding entirely against Russia would have 
possibly undermined these pre-conditions, blunting the ability of SPRFMO achieve its 
objectives from the start. On one hand the chances of it leaving would have been small. 
Jack mackerel is a straddling stock. Therefore as a signatory to the FSA, Russia would still 
have to co-operate with SPRFMO’s conservation measures.405 Leaving SPRFMO would 
have been unlikely to improve Russia’s position. However, on the other hand, Russia may 
have chosen to pursue the dispute further.406 By adding further cost and uncertainty to the 
process, this may have discredited the objection procedure form the start. Ultimately, 
Russia might become inclined to act as an obstructive force within SPFMO, if it felt it had 
little to gain from constructive cooperation. The combined effect of these responses may 
have been to discourage other nations from joining the organisation.  
 
The possible response of Russia remaining within SPRFMO as a disruptive force, instead 
of leaving, might have been a potential example of an anomaly in the FSA. Ӧrebech et al. 
note that the FSA provides that a State can satisfy its duty of cooperation by joining an 
RFMO.407 Conversely, States that are not members of the RFMO must agree to apply the 
conservation and management measures of the relevant RFMO. As only participants within 
RFMOs are entitled to object to CMMs, Article 8 of the FSA thus, arguably, imposes a 
higher burden on non-participants than participants. The policy behind this may have been 
to induce states to become members of RFMOs. In this scenario, it would indeed operate 
to keep Russia within SPRFMO. Whether that would have been a positive for the 
Organisation is open to question.  
  
  
402 Anderson et al, above n 9, at 12-13.  
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Overall, the Panel’s decision can be seen as an important corrective measure. Russia’s 
interests in the fishery were accommodated and the conservation effect of the disputed 
decision was maintained.  It sends a signal that States can successfully challenge 
substantive decisions if they have genuine grounds for doing so. In an RFMO where 
substantive decisions can be taken without consensus, the importance of this should not be 
understated in terms of encouraging further membership of SPRFMO.408 Indeed, in this 
case, the concerns of the minority were essentially overridden by the majority.    Moreover, 
the decision also shows that the Convention’s novel objection procedures ultimately 
worked to resolve a major dispute. Altogether, these outcomes illustrate the merits of 
submitting objections to a form of collective review.  
 
Finally, as SPRFMO moves past this dispute, an important test for the objection procedure 
will be how often it is invoked. For it to be effective it will have to be used judiciously by 
SPRFMO members.409 However, only time will tell whether member states end up abusing 
the objection procedures to stymy the work of SPRFMO.  
D  Synthesis: Is SPRFMO a Model for RFMO Decision-Making?  
The outcomes of the Russia Review Panel arguably bode well for SPRFMO and its 
‘innovative’ decision-making processes. The dispute has apparently been resolved, with 
the objecting State obtaining the main outcome that it was seeking whilst also agreeing to 
not undermine the conservation management measures put in place. Simply put, the 
objection mechanism worked. When this viewed along with SPRFMO’s performance 
against the framework developed in this paper, it forms a compelling model for RFMO 
decision-making. 
 
SPRFMO is part of a trend of RFMOs using increasingly complex decision-adoption and 
objection procedures in order to ensure State behaviour that is consistent with the relevant 
conservation regime and the law of the sea.410 This includes the use of review panels, 
reasoned objections, interim measures to protect fish stock sustainability and limited 
grounds for review. However, SPRFMO takes RFMO design a step further and 
comprehensively applies all these elements to every objection, greatly reducing the scope 
for abuse. The Russia objection case study illustrates that this objection process has worked 
exactly as intended. Furthermore, its decision-adoption process addresses the problems 
  
408 Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 215.  
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associated with strict consensus-based decision-making. SPRFMO thus offers clear 
solutions to the problems associated with RFMO decision-making processes.  
 
McDorman reminds us that it is calculated risk as to whether complex procedures will 
improve effectiveness, or indeed be an improvement on existing models.411 They 
potentially jeopardise timeliness and decision acceptability.412 However, considering 
historically poor performance of RFMOs, new approaches are arguably worth the risk. 
Indeed, States that are serious about creating more robust and effective decision-making 
processes should take a calculated risk and give serious consideration to implementing 
SPRFMO’s approach. Its combination of best practice elements will not prevent all 
disputes, nor will it ensure its members agree on effective conservation and management 
measures. No decision-making can guarantee this.413 However, its rules do ensure is that 
no one member can hold up its process or lawfully undermine the conservation and 
management regime. Moreover, every objection is subject to robust scrutiny. Altogether, 
these procedures do their utmost to force “discipline consistent with the objectives of the 
convention”.414 In an environment where the content and enforcement of decisions 
ultimately comes down to the will of sovereign States, this is arguably the best that can be 
hoped for from a decision-making process.415   
 
In all likelihood, accepting SPRFMO’s processes will probably be too great an 
infringement on State sovereignty for some States. Indeed, McDorman has argued the 
differences between every RFMO mean “there is no one model process for decision-
making that can be held out as the most appropriate for RFMOs”.416 Regardless of whether 
the SPRFMO model works for a particular RFMO, this paper has outlined several 
alternative options that can help RFMO processes strike a better balance between 
Sovereignty and decision-making efficacy. Moreover, Schiffman contends that:417   
 
as existing marine conservation regimes struggle to meet present needs, and newer 
regimes are developed in the future, exemptive mechanisms must evolve to help 
guarantee they do not contribute to the decline of our oceans. At a minimum, states 
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must explore ways to refine them to help ensure that they do not undermine 
conservation objectives 
 
Reforms as simple as appointing independent conciliators and requiring to States to provide 
reasons for an objection can help promote consensus and reduce the abuse of objection 
procedures.  Therefore, there should be few excuses for modest change.  
 
There will be practical difficulties when it comes to introducing international best practice 
into the decision-making processes of all RFMOs. Indeed, McDorman observes:  
 
decision-making procedures for RFMOs, (including the manner for adopting 
decisions, objection procedures, dispute settlement and the infusion of science and 
other factors in decision-making) are almost always found within the constitutive 
treaty establishing the RFMO. Thus, any change to decision-making procedures 
almost always requires amendment of the RFMO constitutive treaty and each treaty 
has its own amendment process.418 
 
Moreover, the OECD notes that “gaining support for change within RFMOs is difficult 
when diverse national agendas and economic priorities are at stake”.419 Comprehensively 
introducing effective decision-making processes will therefore not be easy. However, the 
fact that a diverse array of countries were able to build a best practice regime for the South 
Pacific shows it is possible for States to meet this challenge. Additionally, the new NAFO 
agreement illustrates that a conflict-ridden RFMO can rebuild trust and co-operation and 
agree to introduce a process that will promote more effective decisions.420 Furthermore, 
both SPRFMO and the NAFO reforms demonstrate that States do respond where the state 
of fish stocks reach crisis-like conditions.421 Whilst it is unfortunate that action comes so 
late in the picture, the current state of fish-stocks is arguably conducive to States re-
examining other RFMOs and attempting more meaningful reforms. They will have the 
benefit of SPRFMO’s best practice example if they chose to do so.  
 
VII Conclusion  
“The ability to make management decisions is the defining feature and central task of 
RFMOs.”422 It is therefore unfortunate that “the lack of a resilient and efficient decision-
  
418 McDorman, above n 38, at [8].   
419 Cox et al., above n 189, at 20.  
420 At 103.  
421 Cox et al, above n 189, at ch 5; and Schiffman Marine Conservation, above n 30, at 62-63.  
422 Meltzer, above n 14, at 187  
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making processes” have “often compromised the effectiveness of RFMOs and has 
contributed to the overexploitation of target and non target stocks”.423 The challenge is to 
find solutions that respect “State sovereignty while minimizing the scope of States to hinder 
the adoption and effective implementation of conservation and management measures that 
science and the state of stocks require”.424   
 
SPRFMO’s decision-making structure has arguably met this challenge. Whilst this model 
may not work for all RFMOs, it certainly provides a framework from which others can 
seek to improve their own decision-making processes. Its decision-making approach has 
sought to avoid the fundamental issues identified in this paper. These are the problems 
associated with consensus-based decision-making and easily abused objection procedures. 
Its decision-adoption process seeks to build consensus whilst recognising that it may not 
be possible in every instance. Its objection procedure also acknowledges that States may 
have legitimate reasons to object to a decision, but aims to limit frivolous use as well as 
limit the conservation impact of any objections. The Russia objection has illustrated why 
this process is necessary, and that objection procedures can be designed not only avoid 
negative conservation impacts, but also to promote, rather than undermine, better decision-
making outcomes.  
 
Altogether, SPRFMO’s decision-making approach offers hope that it will succeed where 
others have failed, with principles and an objection process that should keep the 
organisation on track. However, whether this hope is realised will ultimately depend on the 
political will of its members. Indeed, political will is also critical to whether States choose 
to push for further reform in other RFMOs, reform that cannot come soon enough for high 
seas fisheries.  
 
 
  
  
423 Meltzer, above n 14, at 187. 
424 McDorman, above n 38, at [5].  
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